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Development Policy Lab India
Policy Brief Series  ·  Open Access
Policy Brief No. 01
July 2026  ·  developmentlab-india.github.io
Implementation Governance  ·  Centrally Sponsored Schemes  ·  State Capacity
The Implementation Gap:
Why Centrally Sponsored Schemes Underdeliver
India runs approximately 75 Centrally Sponsored Schemes with a combined FY25 budget of Rs 5 trillion. Implementation quality, not scheme design or funding level, determines whether these schemes reach their intended beneficiaries. This brief examines the structural causes of India's implementation gap and recommends five institutional reforms to close it.
State Capacity Governance SDGs Public Finance DPLI Flagship Report 2026
Key Findings
Section 1
The Problem

India possesses one of the most extensive public programme architectures in the developing world. Over three decades, successive governments have expanded welfare schemes, increased expenditure, and directed proportionally higher per capita transfers to its most transfer-dependent states. The inputs are substantial. The outcomes are not converging.

Between the policy announcement and the citizen experience, something breaks down. The gap is consistent, measurable, and well-documented. Yet it persists. This brief argues the reason is structural: India has invested heavily in scheme design and financial transfers while systematically underinvesting in the institutional systems required to make those schemes work.

The result is what the DPLI Flagship Report 2026 calls the implementation paradox: a country where expanding inputs coexist with persistent delivery gaps across health, education, social protection, and financial inclusion.

Section 2
The Evidence
Scale of the scheme architecture

India currently runs approximately 75 Centrally Sponsored Schemes with a combined FY25 budget of Rs 5 trillion, representing 10.4% of the Union Budget. A further 740 Central Sector Schemes operate concurrently. The scheme count was rationalised from 131 CSSs in 2021, but implementation quality has not improved commensurately.

Figure 1  ·  Scale of the implementation challenge
~75
Active Centrally Sponsored Schemes · FY25 budget Rs 5 trillion · 10.4% of Union Budget
740+
Central Sector Schemes running concurrently alongside CSS
22 pts
SDG score gap between Kerala and Bihar on the same national index
The outcome divergence
Table 1  ·  State capacity and SDG performance · NITI Aayog SDG India Index 2023-24
State SDG Score 2023-24 Transfer Dependency DPLI Capacity Tier
Kerala 79 / 100 Low High capacity
Bihar 57 / 100 High Capacity-constrained
Gap 22 points Bihar receives higher per capita central transfers than Kerala
Source: NITI Aayog SDG India Index 2023-24. Transfer dependency ranking: PRS State of State Finances 2023-24 and RBI State Finances data.
The Aspirational Districts Programme: proof of concept
Case Study  ·  Aspirational Districts Programme  ·  NITI Aayog 2018–Present
Implementation as a Development Strategy

Launched in January 2018, the Aspirational Districts Programme targeted India's 112 most underserved districts across 27 states. The programme did not create new schemes. It improved the implementation of existing ones through three mechanisms:

1
Real-time monitoring across 49 KPIs in five sectors: health, education, agriculture, financial inclusion, and infrastructure.
2
Competitive benchmarking that ranked 112 districts monthly on incremental progress, pushing decision-making closer to delivery.
3
District-level accountability that made local administrators directly responsible for outcome improvements, not just expenditure.
Key lesson: Better development outcomes result from stronger implementation systems, not new schemes, not new money. UNDP has lauded ADP as the world's largest results-based governance initiative, reaching 250 million people. (NITI Aayog, 2024; UNDP, 2024)
Section 3
The Institutional Explanation

Why does scheme proliferation persist despite declining marginal returns? Three mechanisms operate simultaneously.

First, political incentives favour announcement over implementation. Announcing a new scheme generates visibility and credit-claiming at the national level. Investing in district administration's capacity to deliver an existing scheme does not. This creates a structural bias toward expansion and away from consolidation.

Second, centre-state coordination failures compound the problem. Centrally Sponsored Schemes are designed at the Union level and implemented by state governments under funding-sharing arrangements. The implementation variable, state institutional capacity, is not a criterion in scheme design. States with weak administrative systems receive schemes they cannot operationalise at the same quality as states with stronger institutions.

Third, measurement systems reward inputs rather than outcomes. Annual budget allocations, expenditure tracking, and scheme compliance audits measure what governments spend, not what citizens receive. The institutional investment required to bridge this gap remains systematically underfunded because it does not produce measurable outputs the current accountability system rewards.

"India's next development frontier is not about expanding what government promises, but about improving how government delivers. Strengthening administrative systems, investing in public personnel, deploying digital technologies, and empowering local institutions are the levers that matter most."
DPLI Flagship Report 2026, Foreword. Anant Srivastava, Founder, Development Policy Lab India
Section 4
Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from DPLI analysis of the Aspirational Districts Programme, the NITI Aayog SDG India Index, and international evidence on scheme rationalisation and implementation reform.

1
Extend the ADP model to all CSS delivery
  • Apply real-time monitoring, competitive benchmarking, and district accountability to all major Centrally Sponsored Schemes, not only the 112 aspirational districts.
  • Establish a Champions of Change equivalent for CSS delivery tracking across all 765 districts.
2
Invest in state implementation capacity as a precondition for scheme allocation
  • Introduce a State Implementation Readiness Assessment before new CSS allocations. States below a minimum institutional capacity threshold should receive capacity-building support first.
  • The 16th Finance Commission should consider administrative capacity as a criterion in the devolution formula.
3
Shift measurement from expenditure to outcomes
  • Replace input-based compliance audits with outcome-linked performance reviews for all CSS.
  • Publish state-level implementation quality scorecards annually, disaggregated by scheme and district.
4
Continue rationalisation: fewer schemes, stronger implementation
  • The rationalisation from 131 to 75 CSSs should continue. Evidence consistently shows fewer, better-implemented programmes outperform more poorly-run ones.
  • Consolidate overlapping schemes into umbrella programmes with flexible state implementation frameworks.
5
Build a National Implementation Monitoring Architecture
  • Establish a dedicated implementation monitoring function within NITI Aayog, drawing on the DPLI India State Governance Data Monitor model.
  • Track administrative capacity, frontline vacancy rates, grievance resolution times, and delivery quality alongside financial expenditure for all major CSS.
Sources and References
NITI Aayog. (2024). SDG India Index and Dashboard 2023-24. Government of India.
NITI Aayog. (2024). Aspirational Districts Programme: Best Practices Compendium. Government of India.
Union Budget 2024-25, Statement 4A: Centrally Sponsored Schemes. Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
PRS Legislative Research. (2024). State of State Finances 2023-24. PRS India.
Reserve Bank of India. (2024). State Finances: A Study of Budgets 2023-24. RBI.
UNDP. (2024). Aspirational Districts Programme. United Nations Development Programme SDG Knowledge Hub.
IDinsight. (2024). Strengthening Administrative Data Quality and Use in India's Aspirational Districts.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., and Woolcock, M. (2017). Building State Capability. Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2017). World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. World Bank.
Srivastava, A. (2026). Building State Capacity for Development Outcomes in India. DPLI Flagship Report 2026.
About DPLI
Development Policy Lab India (DPLI) is an independent governance research initiative producing evidence-based analysis on state capacity and development effectiveness across India's 28 states and 8 union territories. All publications are open access.
Author
Anant Srivastava
Founder and Lead Policy Analyst
Development Policy Lab India